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THE DISINTEGRATION OF LABOR LAW:
SOME NOTES FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF LEGAL TRANSFORMATIONt
Thomas C. Kohler*
The political and civil laws of each nation... should be so appropriate to
the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one
nation can suit another.1
Hiite Dich, sei wach und munter!2
Montesquieu's warning about the particularities of legal institu-
tions should be kept in mind by anyone engaged in any sort of com-
parative work-but perhaps especially by anyone who is tempted to
think about labor and employment ordering issues in comparative
perspective, and possibly all the more, by anyone who would consider
the institutions of collective labor law from such a viewpoint. It may
be virtually a "rule" of comparative research that distinct legal systems
t This article is dedicated with the greatest affection, admiration, and respect to
Mary Ann Glendon. I am deeply indebted to her for a great many things, scholarly
and otherwise, but most particularly for her friendship.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This article is a sketch of a
larger work in which the author is engaged. He acknowledges with deep gratitude
the support of The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the German-
American Fulbright Commission. The author also thanks Professors Spiros Simitis
and Michael Kittner for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this piece.
1 MONTEsQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws Bk. I, ch. 3 at 8 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia
Carolyn Miller, & Harold Samuel Stone trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1748) (writing on positive laws). But cf. Stig Str6mholm, Rechtsvergleichung und Recht-
sangleichung, 56 RABELs ZErrUNG FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRiVA-
TREcrrr 611 (1992) [RABELSZ] (questioning whether the dominance of economic
rationality has so displaced ideological and intellectual habits bound-up with national
histories and cultures as to make them largely irrelevant).
2 "Protect yourself, be alert and lively!" [from Eichendorff] quoted in KONRAD
ZwEIGERT & HEIN K3vz, EINFjHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG § 3 III at 35
(3.Auflage, 1996). Translations from German are the author's.
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work out strikingly similar solutions to life's common problems, de-
spite the differences in the historical development of those legal re-
gimes, in the character of their theoretical structures, and in the style
by which the standards they have developed are applied.3 Moreover,
like the institutions of marriage and family, where comparative reflec-
tion has been broadly and fruitfully practiced,4 employment repre-
sents one of life's basic relationships,5 and some legal scheme for the
protection of individual employees and their status, as well as for the
collective regulation of the employment relationship, can be found in
every economically-developed country. Nevertheless, unlike family
law, where there has been an impressive exchange and assimilation of
ideas and practices across national and cultural borders, employment
law,6 but particularly collective labor law, has demonstrated relatively
3 See id. § 3 III at 38. But cf Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Con-
verging, 45 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996) (highlighting epistemological differences
between civil and common law approaches, and challenging a praesumptio simili-
tudinis); Pierre Legrand, Comparer, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr COMPAR 279
(1996).
4 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989); Spiros Simitis,
Familienrecht, in RECHTSWISSENScHAFT IN DER BONNER REPUBLIC STUDIEN ZUR WISSEN-
SCHAFTSGESCHICHTE DERJURISPRUDENZ 390 (Dieter Simon ed., 1994) (see especially at
pp. 420-34, discussing the development and application of comparative methods in
family law.); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 4-15 (1974) (discussing the surprising susceptibility of family law issues to
comparative method).
5 As Blackstone famously observed, the "three great relationships of private life
are" those of "husband and wife," "parent and child," and "master and servant." 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422. In saying this, he, perhaps unconsciously,
echoes Aristotle, who makes a similar observation at the start of the POLITICS, Book I,
chs. 2-4. On the state of and trends in this elemental, if increasingly unstable, rela-
tionship in the United States context, see Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew W. Finkin,
Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L.
(forthcoming 1998).
6 As ill be seen, one of the difficulties in comparative discussions of labor and
employment law is definitional: the terms and relations of one system often hold very
different meanings in another. Hence, nearly everywhere, the term "labor law" refers
to the law of collective bargaining and collective agreements. In many systems, how-
ever, such as Germany, the term more widely indicates the entire body of legal regula-
tion that touches upon and structures the employment relationship. Broadly
speaking, this includes both individual and collective labor law, as well as the law of
social security. The last mentioned comprises not only pensions, but unemployment
and accident insurance, sickness pay, etc., which originally were tied to the employ-
ment relationship. (As the scope of "social legislation" has expanded to include per-
sons outside the labor market, however, social and labor law in Germany, as well as
other advanced economies, have become separate areas of the law, and have exper-
ienced an increasingly independent development. See generally Hans F. Zacher,
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less such porousness, and the specific practices and institutions associ-
ated with the latter, decidedly less transplantability.7
While the manner of their unfolding differs, technology and in-
dustrialization hardly represent distinctively national events. Similarly
unconfined to one nation's experience is the emergence of independ-
ent employee-organizations, and regardless of the initial ideological
orientations or programs of these associations, their acceptance in the
main of the institutions of a market economy. The legal responses to
the consequences of industrialization and technology on employed
persons, but especially to organized labor and the institutions of col-
lective bargaining, however, have varied rather widely,8 and especially
the latter seem more deeply-conditioned by a society's political institu-
tions, and its particular "habits of the heart,"9 than most other aspects
Juridification in the Field of Social Law, inJulurmMCKTION OF SocIAL SPHERES: A COMPARA-
TIV ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTrrrusr AND SocIAL WELFARE
LA-W 374 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) [hereinafter JURIDFCATION OF SoCIAL
SPHERES]. The various components of the labor law scheme operate together as an
articulated whole, and it would be very misleading to attempt to understand the law
regulating the individual employment relationship in isolation from collective labor
law.
In contrast, in the United States, "labor law" typically designates solely collective
bargaining, while the term "employment law" refers to a pastiche of statutory and
common law protections for the individual employee. These include the statutory
prohibitions of race, sex, creed, age, or disability discrimination in employment, as
well as judicially-developed restrictions against unfair dismissals. They also include
safety, health, and (to the extent they exist) protections of employee privacy. While
labor and employment are not wholly distinct fields in United States law, they rest on
different bases, and are intended to achieve rather different goals. Unlike systems
such as Germany's, American employment law has had a piecemeal development, and
its various aspects often stand quite independently from one another. On this prob-
lem of language and meanings, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
7 Perceptive commentators long have suggested that standards and practices af-
fecting the substantive terms of the individual employment relationship are far more
"transplantable" to other systems than are the rules and standards concerning collec-
tive labor law. See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, supra note 4, at 20-27; see also Lord Wedder-
burn of Charlton, The Social Charter in Britain-Labour Law and Labour Courts, 54
Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
8 One distinguished commentator has suggested that despite these variations,
"juridification," or growing state involvement, is a universal characteristic of the devel-
opment of employment regulation in economically-developed nations. See Spiros
Simitis, Juridification of Labor Relations, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES, supra
note 6, at 113.
9 The phrase, of course, is Tocqueille's. ALxIS DE TOCQUELLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AmERIcA 287 (J.P. Meyer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969) (i.e., "the different
notions possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, and the sum of
ideas that shape mental habits." Id.).
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of an ordering regime.' 0 Consequently, as one noted commentator
has observed, "the language of a labour law system can be learned
only from its social history, above all the history of its labour move-
ment. Without a smattering of that vocabulary comparative conversa-
tion is impossible."'"
This hardly suggests that comparisons of employment-ordering
regimes constitute bootless undertakings, nor that the characteristics
of and the meanings that inform these regimes represent a series of
incommensurables that would make any sort of comparative analysis
meaningless. The possibility of comparisons for the practical ends of
identifying, interpreting, and assessing the impact of foreign stan-
dards on contemplated conduct generally is admitted. Nevertheless,
strong reservations continue to persist in some quarters about the le-
gitimacy of any critical comparative analysis of labor and employment
law issues, and of attempts to suggest the adaptation of the lessons
learned from foreign experiences to the resolution of a domestic
problem. These misgivings typically rest on the view that labor and
employment law represents a field so bound-up with the unique char-
acter of national habits, ideology, and experiences as to exclude any
sort of reflection employing external, i.e., extra-national, or cogni-
tional, reference points. 12
At least from an American perspective (or perhaps especially
from this perspective), a further difficulty exists. Nearly twenty-five
years ago, Otto Kahn-Freund lamented "that labour lawyers do not
often show an interest in comparative law, and even more that few
10 Hence, practices connected with and standards concerning collective bargain-
ing typically have shown themselves to be resistant to transplantation. On this topic,
see Kahn-Freund, supra note 4, at 20-27. For an extensive review of attitudes toward,
and disputes over, the use of comparative approaches in labor and employment law,
see Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425
(1985).
11 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, supra note 7, at 7. Lord Wedderburn
continues:
But it would be absurd to think that the history of each labour movement
writes its labour law system on tablets of stone. It writes the vocabulary, but
other factors change the story, even the grammar: periods of war, new con-
stitutions, social movements, changes in employers' organisation, in technol-
ogy and in patterns of capital, and in relations of production national and
now, above all, international.
Id. at 8. Part of our concern here is to point out the reflexive relationship between
the "factors that change the story," and the change in the pattern of human meanings
that accompany these transformations in the order of our common life.
12 See Spiros Simitis, Denationalizing Labour Law: The Case of Age Discrimination, 15
COMP. LAB. L.J. 321, 323-26 (1994).
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comparative lawyers pay much attention to labour law."u3 Today, at
least in the United States, only a relatively small number of academic
lawyers devote much attention to either subject (and one might with
reason wonder about a person who expresses an interest in both).' 4
American lawyers traditionally have exhibited a strong tendency to-
ward insularity, which has been strengthened in recent decades by the
growing influence and prestige of American constitutional thought,
regulatory and statutory developments, and legal theory. Briefly
stated, it appears that we have little reason or incentive to look
elsewhere.
Self-contentment has its advantages, but as the experience of vari-
ous sectors of American industry during the 1980s so starkly illus-
trates, it can be a very costly pleasure. Human creativity and insight
knows no borders,15 and in any event, the juridical boundaries of the
modern nation-state are becoming increasingly irrelevant. As every-
one now realizes, an intrinsic relationship exists between law and
economy, and these structures in turn are anchored in schemes of
meanings that proceed from deeply-held, if often unexamined, no-
tions of human personhood. The processes of the "globalization" of
the economy imply not only fundamental changes for legal-ordering,
but the creation of new meaning schemes by which we understand the
societies and institutions which give us our orientation and identity as
persons.
In short, our times and circumstances will force us into thinking
about issues in comparative perspective, whether we like it or not.
This may be particularly true for those who devote their time to ques-
tions dealing with employment and the manner of its ordering. For
better or worse, employment has become a, if not the, universal preoc-
cupation of our era. The worldwide increase of participation in "mar-
ket work," particularly among women, represents one of the most
striking and significant social developments of the past thirty years.
Technology is transforming the way we work, and the structures and
practices by which employment is ordered have come under tremen-
dous, if not destructive, pressure. The metamorphosis of both work
and the patterns of its ordering, however, does not imply the disap-
pearance of either. As Bernard Lonergan observed, "non-systematic
13 Otto Kahn-Freund, Pacta Sunt Servanda-A Principle and Its Limits: Some
Thoughts Prompted by Comparative Labour Law, 48 TULANE L. REv. 894, 906 (1974).
14 For an exculpation, see Mary Ann Glendon, Wy Cross Boundaries?, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 971 (1996).
15 See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
(Harper & Row 1978) (1957).
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processes can be the womb of novelty."1 6 New patterns are seeking to
emerge, and while we can ignore them, hopefully abandoning them
and their development to their own devices, work and the issues sur-
rounding it will not vanish. Like the economy, the problems of order-
ing have jumped borders, and we have no alternative if we are to act
responsibly but to follow-however tricky or dangerous that undertak-
ing might be.
"Any attempt to make.., a comparison is a risky undertaking,"17
Clyde Summers has remarked. "Because of incomplete knowledge,
relevant considerations may be overlooked or misconstrued," and
"deep-running social attitudes, political values, or historical traditions
may not be fully or accurately sensed."' 8 By its nature, he points out,
comparative work heightens our sensitivity to these dangers. As one
comes to the realization of "how much he has failed to understand his
own system, he must fear that he has failed to understand the other.
But the value of comparison remains, for comparison provides a
framework and focus outside either system for viewing both."19
The risks Summers so eloquently and perceptively describes have
been exacerbated further by the sorts of issues and challenges that the
current situation raises. From the start, those pursuing comparative
legal undertakings have been forced to pass not only beyond national
borders, but across disciplinary boundaries as well.20 The movements
driving the transformations that are going forward in our economic,
legal, and social schemes, however, are dissolving the lines between
disciplines even as rapidly as they are eroding the once-firm lines that
separated states. These changes will drive lawyers-along with
others-still deeper into exotic and uncharted regions, and compel
them to confront such unsettling questions as human personhood
and its meaning, that once were the province of the philosophers and
the moralists alone.21
What follows, however, constitutes no full-blown expedition, even
though it is prey to all of the dangers, frailties, and missteps to which
any comparative excursion necessarily is subject. Instead, as adver-
tised, it represents something in the nature of an advance-party, or a
16 Id. at 51.
17 Clyde Summers, Worker Participation in Sweden and the United States: Some Com-
parisons from an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 177 (1984). On the dan-
gers and value of comparative work, see also Glendon, supra note 14.
18 Summers, supra note 17, at 177.
19 Id.
20 This is nothing new to labor lawyers: see infra note 67.
21 See, e.g., Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Individualisme et "communautarisme" en droit ftan-
fais: le cas des relations de travai4 1993 BYU L. REv. 693, 693-95.
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reconnaissance team. By attempting to scout-out some of the ground
and a few of the characteristics of the labor law regimes of two order-
ing systems, it will seek to provide a tentative and very partial sketch
about where we have been, on the way to evaluating where we might
be going, and what that might mean for us.
II
The emergence or the disappearance of a legal category, such as
labor law, signifies that some fundamental change is going forward in
a society. New patterns of acting and cooperating are being worked
out and are finding common acceptance. These patterns reflect fresh
conceptions, understandings, and intentions about the constitution of
our lives in common, and how we most effectively and regularly can
achieve the ends toward which our activities are directed. More signif-
icantly, the growing acceptance of the new arrangements manifests
the cumulative judgment that they are satisfactory, if not desirable,
and that they establish sensical schemes to obtain goals that are in
themselves worthwhile. In short, the "new order" entails the creation
of a new set of meanings, and thereby, a new way of being. As a result,
the "old order," and the meanings that grounded it, often become
increasingly opaque to us. Other images now condition the way we
imagine ourselves and our world, and provide the motives for our
daily routines. "The past is a foreign country," opens L.P. Hartley's
novel The Go-Between, "they do things differently there. '22
It is easy enough for us to overlook the full or authentic signifi-
cance of our temporally "domestic" activities. They quietly cut their
grooves in us without our notice, thereby steadily and insidiously es-
tablishing the horizons by which we take our bearings. Their massive-
ness in our lives and imaginations seems to suggest a sort of givenness
and inevitability about them. This problem of meaning frequently
takes on considerably different dimensions when we become the "for-
eigners" who attempt to deal with the social, religious, or legal
schemes previous generations bequeathed to us. Like dazed and dis-
oriented travelers, we can fail to appreciate the complete significance
of what we have heard and seen. We mouth the words, gaze at the
symbols, and read from the same text, but the full sense of it all some-
how eludes us. The world our ancestors inhabited seems to be an
entirely different place than ours-and perhaps, we suspect, we some-
how have become different sorts of beings as well.
22 L.P. HARTLEY, THE Go-BETWEEN 1 (1958).
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Seventy or so years ago, labor law represented a new legal cate-
gory that was struggling to come into its own, both in the United
States and in the industrialized nations of Europe, particularly in Ger-
many.23 Few branches of law have had a more contentious develop-
ment, or have been born of and shaped by such spectacular clashes.
After several decades of experimentation, missteps, conflicts, and
compromises, the institutional schemes and patterns of meaning be-
gan to assume their presently-recognizable forms, and by the early
1920s, labor law had started to emerge as an independent field, both
in German as well as in American law.
Of course, in one respect, the legal regulation of the employment
relationship hardly represents anything new, as enactments like the
Statute of Laborers of 1351,24 or the famous Elizabethan Statute of
Artificers of 1563,25 remind us. Space constrains anything but the
briefest sketch of this vast and complex theme. Suffice it to say that by
the end of the nineteenth century, labor law "could be understood
and was understood as the realization of two principles: of self-help
and state-help. ' 26 The trade union movement and collective bargain-
ing represent the former, while the latter is exemplified by various
types of legislation designed to protect the weaker party in the em-
ployment relationship. Generally speaking, interventionary legisla-
tion first took the form of protective legislation which set limitations
and prohibitions upon labor by children, and later, by women, before
slowly developing as more generally applicable safety, health, or hours
legislation. More comprehensively, interventionary legislation also
took the form of state-sponsored insurance and assistance schemes,
such as workers' compensation, sickness and retirement benefits, and
similar schemes which acted to spread some of the risks of life in an
industrially-based, capitalist economy. As the scope of these schemes
were extended to persons outside the employment relationship and
the labor market, they became institutional components of the mod-
ern welfare-state. 27
23 As previously mentioned, the term "labor law" entails definitional problems.
See supra notes 6 and 11. For a discussion of the term's meaning and influences be-
hind the emergence of the field, see Bob Hepple, Introduction to THE MAKING OF
LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON NINE COUNTRIES UP TO 1945 at 1
(Bob Hepple ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF LABOUR LAW].
24 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, ch. 2.
25 5 Eliz. 1, ch. 4.
26 Thilo Ramm, Epilogue: The New Ordering of Labour Law, 1918-45, in THE MAK-
ING OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 23, at 277.
27 On this point, see generally Zacher, supra note 6.
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As is well-known, in the case of the United States, "self-help"
rather than "state-help" played the predominant role in the realiza-
tion of what Americans would come to think of as labor law.28 A vari-
ety of factors account for the relatively modest role played by
interventionary legislation during the first several decades of this cen-
tury,2 9 which included not only judicial opposition,"° but a long-stand-
ing policy of distrust of government intervention in employment
matters by significant portions of the labor movement as well.31 Con-
sequently, the appearance in the United States of what we now typi-
cally think of as labor law tends to be associated with the passage of
the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act in 1935,32 but that is a
misperception. 33 To the extent that law school curricula serve as any
guide, labor law was beginning to be recognized as a distinct legal
category shortly after World War I. Harvard, for example, inaugu-
rated a labor law course in 1920.34 At about the same time, the dean
of Columbia's law faculty, Harlan Fiske Stone, declared that the law
schools had an important role to play "in the development of this new
28 Indeed, the notion of "free" collective bargaining would become a fundamen-
tal characteristic of the American labor relations law scheme: this is the idea that the
substantive terms of the employment relationship are best determined by the parties
themselves, free of governmental influence or intervention. (However, as Simitis ob-
serves, the very passage of the Wagner Act represents the presence of state interven-
tion. See Simitis, supra note 8, at 120.)
29 On this point, see generally the classic piece by Derek Bok, Reflections on the
Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1394 (1971).
30 The best-known example of which probably is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding as unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a state statue limiting the working hours of bakery employees).
31 Thus, until the depression-era, the American Federation of Labor opposed
nearly all forms of "protective" legislation, including minimum wage and hour legisla-
tion, unemployment and retirement insurance, etc. For an analysis of the rationale,
development, and changes in this policy of "voluntarism," see GEORGE GiumAvt HIe,-
GINS, VOLUNTARISM IN ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930-1940 (Arno &
The New York Times 1969) (1944). See also Elisabeth Brandeis, Organized Labor and
Protective Legislation, in LABOR AND THE Nrw DEAL 123 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young
eds., 1961); Edwin Witte, Organized Labor and Social Security, in LABOR AND THE NEW
DEAL, supra, at 241.
32 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1996).
33 On this point, see the brief but insightful review by Benjamin Aaron, A Half-
Century of Labor Relations Law and Collective Bargaining, 13 The Lab. Law. 551 (1998).
34 Noel T. Dowling, Book Review, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 202, 203 (1923) (reviewing
FRANcis BowFs SAYRE, A SEEClON OF CASES AND OTmR AUTHORmEs ON LABOR LAW
(1922)). Sayre was the teacher of this course.
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body of law."'35 Columbia subsequently introduced a course in "Indus-
trial Relations" in 1922.
The publication that year of Francis B. Sayre's casebook on labor
law may represent one of the clearest signs of the advent of the field.
"Labor law has in recent years been attracting widespread attention,"
Sayre observed in his Preface, and it is "in response to the growing
demand for an adequate collection of cases on the subject this volume
is published."-36 Sayre's work departs in significant ways from the
precedents established by the founder of the casebook, Christopher
Columbus Langdell. Sayre annotated his cases with an extensive se-
ries of notes, and he included a rather large selection of ancient and
modem English legislative materials, as well as American and Cana-
dian statutes. 37 In addition, the book quotes from a variety of secon-
dary texts and contains several decisions by the Australian Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration and the Kansas Court of Industrial Rela-
tions concerning the question of "the living wage.138 To further eluci-
date the discussions in these cases, Sayre reproduced in the book's
appendix, the "Minimum of Subsistence and Minimum Comfort
Budget" which had been prepared by the Bureau of Applied Econom-
ics for the Interchurch World Movement Steel Strike Commission's
Report on the Steel Strike of 1919.
Sayre's book represents one of the earliest, if not the first, law
school texts devoted to the topic we now generally refer to as "labor
law."39 Despite the novelty of his work,40 however, Sayre's terse Pref-
35 Id. at 203. In Dean Stone's view, "It is for the law schools an important task to
systematize this body of legal doctrine as it develops and there already exists a mass of
material in the form ofjudicial decisions requiring study and analysis by modem law
school methods as an important step in the development of this new body of law." Id.
36 SAYRE, supra note 34, at v.
37 These included excerpts from the Clayton Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a portion of the Canadian
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907.
38 Also referred to as the "family wage."
39 The first American text that I have found using the term "labor law" in its title
is F. J. Stimson's 1896 work entitled, HANDBOOK TO THE LABOR LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES. Of its ten chapters, one is devoted to a discussion of the individual employ-
ment contract; three to various sorts of state protective legislation; one (very short)
chapter to employment-related torts; another (and even shorter) chapter to profit
sharing and worker-cooperative arrangements; and four chapters to topics related to
unions and collective bargaining (these latter chapters make-up more than half the
book's text).
40 A matter noted by several of Sayre's reviewers. See, e.g., W.R. Vance, Book Re-
view, 36 HARv. L. REV. 634 (1923); Herbert F. Goodrich, Book Review, 21 MICH. L.
REv. 716 (1923);Jackson H. Ralston, Book Review, 71 U. PA. L. REv. 294 (1923); Karl
Nickerson Llewellyn, Book Review, 33 YALE LJ. 226 (1924).
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ace gives no discussion of the book's plan, nor does he there or any-
where else in the volume apparently find it necessary to define what
he means by "labor law." Instead, Sayre simply expresses the hope
that "this collection of cases" may prove useful to those "interested in
studying the development and application of the legal principles
which make up the body of labor law."41 The book's contents, how-
ever, would be entirely familiar to anyone possessing even a passing
acquaintance with the institutions and mechanisms of collective
bargaining.
Legal, political, and economic arrangements, the family, mores,
and similar social institutions, all represent what might be called
schemes of recurrence. 42 Such schemes constitute relatively stable
and commonly understood and accepted patterns of cooperating to
achieve desired ends. Legal schemes, for instance, in part are in-
tended to facilitate and accommodate the orderly operation of a man-
ifold series of social schemes with one another. They accomplish this
not only through the law's direct regulative effects, but through the
fact that the law is a highly influential mediator and teacher of values.
Consequently, a "legal category," such as labor law or family law, also
performs an heuristic function. As specialized branches of legal sci-
ence, they generate a set of terms and relations through which we
organize and attempt to make intelligible various patterns of human
activities. In other words, they function as more or less adequate re-
current schemes for structuring our knowing and for assigning mean-
ings to our undertakings. Accordingly, law and its categories play an
important role in setting the imaginative conditions under which we
live, both for lawyers as well as others in a modem society.
These recurrent social schemes stand in a mutually conditioning
relationship, and a change in the operation of one eventually will af-
fect the others. Thus, the emergence, stability, development, or de-
cline of recurrent social schemes is not the product of some blind
determinism, but of a conditioned series of probabilities which reflect
long and intersecting series of human choices. Each of our choices is
made in accordance with a scale of values, and in light of the context
of meanings available to us.43 Similarly, each of our decisions, when
acted upon, shifts in some degree the scale of probabilities. In short,
41 Sayre, supra note 34, at v.
42 For commentary on recurrent schemes, seeJosEPH FLANAGAN, QuFr FOR SELF-
KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY 100-12 (1997); BERNARD J.F.
LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 47-55 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1990) (1972) [here-
inafter LONERGAN, METHOD N THEOLOGY]; LONERGAN, supra note 15, at 118-25,
207-14, 459-63.
43 On valuing, see LONERGAN, METHOD N THEOLOGY, supra note 42, at 27-41.
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everything counts. For the reasons sketched in the opening
paragraphs of this essay, however, changes in institutional schemes
tend to occur slowly because they involve some common acceptance
of new understandings and a certain degree of willingness to cooper-
ate in some new way of being. Hence, the emergence or disappear-
ance of a legal category also tends to be more a matter of rumor,
suggestion, the slow recognition of developing patterns, or a creeping
sort of forgetfulness, than an unexpected discovery breathlessly an-
nounced in a hastily-arranged press-conference.
As in the United States, the recognition of labor law as a distinct
legal category occurred in Germany in the period following World
War I. Its arrival there was proclaimed by the prominent Frankfurt
lawyer, law professor, and social democrat who had played the leading
role in developing a consistent methodological framework within
which to order and accommodate its various features: Hugo
Sinzheimer.4 4 In a lecture he delivered in 1926 entitled, "Basic Ques-
tions about Labor Law,"45 Sinzheimer confidently declared to his lis-
teners that "[1]abor law has become its own, independent [body of]
law, that has its own principles and its own independent forms. '46
Moreover, this new field was not just another dust-dry set of recondite
general principles and niggling exceptions. It represented the law on
a mission. "To uphold human dignity," Sinzheimer explained, "is the
special task of labor law ... [;] it brings into being a 'real humanity,'
44 On the significance of Sinzheimer's work and contributions, see Otto Kahn-
Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1914), in I Huco SINZHEIMER, ARBEITSRECHT UND
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE UND REDEN 1 (Otto Kahn-Freund & Thilo
Ramm eds., 1976) [hereinafter, SINZHEIMER]; for a concise biography of Sinzheimer,
see the entry by R. Schimmel in JuRISTEN: EIN BIOGRAPHISCHES LEXIKON 568 (Michael
Stolleis ed., 1995).
45 See Spiros Simitis, Hat das Arbeitsrecht noch eine Zukunf ?, Plenary Address Before
the Fifth European Regional Congress of Labour Law and Social Security (Sept. 18,
1996); see Hugo Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrechts, in SINZHEIMER, supra note 44,
at 108.
46 As early as 1910, Sinzheimer stated that Philipp Lotmar, through the publica-
tion of his work, DER ARBEITSVERTRAG (THE EMPLOYMENT CoNTRACr, vol. I, 1902; vol.
II, 1908) had "created labor law as a special discipline within legal science." Quoted in
Reinhard Richardi, Begriff und Entstehung des Arbeitsrechts, in I MONCHNER HANDBUCH
ZUM ARBErrsRECHT §1 at 2 (Reinhard Richardi & Otfried Wlotzke eds., 1992). Accord-
ing to Alfred S611ner, however, Lotmar's conception of the employment agreement
was not as advanced as that which appeared in the much-criticized provisions of the
1900 German Civil Code [BGB]. This explains why Lotmar's work had comparatively
little practical influence in the years after its appearance. Alfred S611ner, Der indus-
trielle Arbeitsvertrag in der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts, in STUDIEN ZUR
EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE 288, 293-94 (Walter Wilhelm ed., 1972).
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that is much more than some mere ideological humanism. '47 Conse-
quently, labor law constituted a living topic, or as Sinzheimer de-
scribed it, "the developing law of the present."48  Like the
contemporary biological sciences, labor law represented the cutting
edge of legal science, and the problems and adversities of concrete
human existence4 9 in a technological age would be pursued and
47 Simitis, supra note 45, at 1.
48 Id. Sinzheimer's characterization of labor law as "developing law" had a spe-
cial significance in the German context. The German Civil Code, including the provi-
sions through which it mediated the order of the employment relationship (primarily
§§ 611-30 BGB), grew out of the methods of an abstract "conceptualjurisprudence."
In Max Weber's analysis of patterns of legal thought, this approach epitomized a sys-
tem of "logical formal rationalism," i.e., a pattern of legal thought that expresses its
rules through abstract concepts that are creatures of legal thought itself, and which
constitute a "gapless" system that encompasses or "subsumes" all contingencies. On
this topic, see Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY xxv, xxxv-lv (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1954). For an excellent discussion of the development of this
methodology, see FRANz WIuAcKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 341-62
(Tony Wier trans., 1995).
49 As was true of the American common law of the late 19th Century, the BGB's
understanding of employment was conditioned by formal notions of contractual free-
dom and household-based, master-servant relationships. (On the American common
law, see MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND TE NEW PROPERTY, 147-70
(1981). Hence, Sinzheimer and his colleagues faced two related tasks: they had to
separate labor law from the dominant private law scheme and had to establish it as a
separate category by developing a new set of terms and relations through which mass
employment relationships and collective bargaining agreements could be compre-
hended by German law.
On the way to accomplishing these tasks, Sinzheimer insisted that labor law must
abjure the abstract formalistic methodology of the civil code and attend instead to the
concrete data of real life work-relationships. Thus, he maintained, the principles for
the shaping of labor law could not be drawn "simply from the elements of statutory
provisions" that the civil code posited. Rather, "because these elements are not ex-
haustive, the attempt [must] be made to bring to recognition the way the employ-
ment relationship actually manifests itself." Such an approach, Sinzheimer observed,
would "show immediately, that the content of the employment relationship is much
richer, and therewith the scope of its governing formal principles much wider, than it
appears according to the abstract statutory elements." HUGO SINZHEIMER, I DER
KORPORATIVE ARBEITSNORMENVERTRAG 1-2, 3-27 passim (1907).
It is interesting to compare Sinzheimer's approach with that taken by the United
States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Thlogy, 363 U.S. 564 (1960). There, the
Court warned the lower courts against a "preoccupation with ordinary contract law"
when approaching labor law issues. Id. at 567. "In our role of developing a meaning-
ful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements," the Court instructed, "we think special heed should be given to the
context in which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the purpose
they are intended to serve." Id. at 567. Such an approach is required because the
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worked out on its terrain, according to its dynamically developing pro-
tocols. The sheer importance of the field, and intellectual challenges
it posed, would draw the best minds to it. The so-called "social ques-
tion" or "worker question" had preoccupied both Europe and the
United States for decades and had absorbed the attention of everyone
from Karl Marx to the incumbents of the Holy See, in particular Pope
Leo XIII.50 After years of trying, the law finally had developed a
method for approaching and attempting to resolve labor issues, which
of necessity affected nearly every other aspect of life as well. Bluntly
put: this would be the field where the legal rubber hit the road.
Sinzheimer's palpable excitement about his subject mirrored both its
novelty and its importance.
Certainly, the circumstances and attitudes that conditioned and
informed the conception and realization of labor law in Germany dif-
fered in several important respects from those that affected its emer-
gence and development in the United States. Once more, this is a
large and complex topic, and space permits only a brief mention of a
few of its key features. Succinctly stated, if labor law represents the
product of self-help and state-help, it is the role of the latter in the
German case, and the attitudes toward the state that it reflects, 5 ' that
constitutes one of the most striking differences between the American
and German versions of labor law.
collective bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code"
which represents "an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government." Id. at 578,
580. The special nature of the collective agreement is reflected in the fact that it
"covers the whole employment relationship" and "calls into being a new common
law-the common law of a particular industry or a particular plant." Id. at 579. A
comparative study of the impact of labor law on the legal methods of common and
civilian lawyers might reveal much about the development of legal thinking generally
during the past seventy years.
50 Leo XIII (1878-1903) was the author of the highly influential RERUM NOVARUM
[THE CONDITION OF LABOR] (1891), the first in the line of social encyclicals. Among
other things, the encyclical approved of the formation of autonomous unions, en-
couraged the adoption of the family wage, and provided a preliminary sketch of what
would become known as the principle of subsidiarity. The vastness of the literature
concerning the social teachings reflects the breadth of their influence. For an histori-
cal introduction, see PAUL MISNER, SOCIAL CATHOLICISM IN EUROPE (1991); on sub-
sidiarity, see Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation and the
Meaning of Subsidiariy, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 607 (1993) and sources cited therein.
51 On these attitudes see Hepple, Welfare Legislation and Wage-Labour, in THE MAK-
ING OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 23, at 135-37; Ramm, supra note 26, at 277-78; Kahn-
Freund, in SINZHEIMER, supra note 44, at 7-8. For a comprehensive discussion and
analysis of the development of these social welfare and worker-protection schemes,
see THOMAS NIPPERDEY, I DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE, 1866-1918: ERsFa BAND ARBErr-
SWELT UND BIORGERGEIST, 335-73 (1994).
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To characterize it in a few words, German labor law began its
development in a "top-down" fashion, as "worker protection law."52
This protective law first appeared in the guise of the Bismarkian social
insurance legislation (which intervened little in the substantive terms
of employment), and subsequently (after 1890), as enactments which
limited working hours and set specifications concerning health, safety,
and other conditions of employment. A second aspect of state in-
terventionary legislation, to which Sinzheimer referred as "work free-
dom legislation,"53 concerned the statutory establishment of worker
participation in decisionmaking through the establishment of works
councils. A third component of this protective scheme, which embod-
ies the elements of self-help, and which might be thought of as arising
in something of a "bottoms-up" way, is the law governing collective
bargaining and associational freedom.5 4 Thus, historically there has
been a close relationship between labor law and social legislation in
Germany, and the German unions have employed both legislation
and collective bargaining in a more or less coordinated way to achieve
their goals.
As can be seen, several factors distinguished the German labor
law scheme from the one that contemporaneously was emerging in
52 See, e.g., ALFRED SOLLNER, GRUNDRIB DES ARBEITSRECHTS, § 5, II at 30
(ll-Auflage, 1994). The basic features of German labor law were shaped during the
period between 1918 and 1928. Some sense of the prevailing view of the state's role
in employment can be found in the Weimarer Reichverfassung [Constitution] of
1919; e.g., Art. 7, 9: "The Reich has law-making authority over... labor law, the
insuring and protection of workers and salaried employees .... ; Art. 157: "The labor
force stands under the special protection of the Reich."
53 ("Arbeitsfreiheitsgesetzgebung") Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Arbeiterbewegung, in
SINZHEIMER, supra note 44, at 102. The works councils were not an invention of the
unions, and their rather involved history dates back to the first part of the nineteenth
century. On the whole, however, their use was a reaction to the labor movement and
represents the attempt by management to provide an alternative to unions, as well as
a means to legitimize its authority. The first act concerning workers participation was
passed in 1891 over the opposition of the unions and the Social Democratic Party. A
change in views and strategies by the labor movement concerning workplace interest
representation led to the 1920 Works Councils Act (see infra note 56), in which
Sinzheimer's ideas played an important role. On these points, see MANFRED WEISS,
LABOUR LAW AND INDusTRUAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY, 448-51 (1995); for a compar-
ative overview, see Thomas C. Kohler, Betriebliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinigten
Staaten: Ein Uerblick, 46 ARBErr riND RcHT (forthcoming 1998).
54 See Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Arbeiterbewegung, in SINZHEIMER, supra note 44,
at 102. As Ramm remarks, "Labour protection law in the wide sense of the word
covered all employment protective statutes as well as the law on collective labour or-
ganisations and industrial disputes and the law on workers' representation. It was
more than labour law, because besides the law on labour relations," it covered welfare
legislation as well. Ramm, supra note 26, at 278.
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the United States.5 5 Taken together, the two can be seen as represent-
ing contrasting "ideal types," between which the employment order-
ing regimes of other nations would come to fall. Given its
development as protective law, it is not surprising that a relatively high
level of intervention has characterized the German system, which ex-
presses itself in the rather elaborate statutory "scaffolding" that has
come to surround the employment relationship both at the individual
and collective level. It early developed a statutorily-based scheme of
protection against unfair discharge, 56 and it consistently has empha-
sized employment stability over capital mobility. Its idea of social soli-
darity is in part reflected in the fact that the system rests on a
corporatist structure of worker and employer organizations, whose re-
lationship partially is mediated through various formal and informal
state structures. Beneath it all rest notions of personhood and individ-
ualism that, while distinct in origin from those which traditionally in-
formed the American system, nevertheless have had considerable
influence upon it, particularly during the past half-century.
Fifteen years after labor law's entry into the law school curricula,
Congress, through its passage in 1935 of the Wagner Act, adopted an
employment ordering scheme whose features had been worked out
on a grass-roots basis during the previous forty or so years. The mean-
ings and understandings that informed this scheme were by that time
well-known and broadly accepted. As one observer put it, they con-
stantly had been reiterated "in reports of industrial commissions,
court decisions, rulings of administrative bodies, and legislation";
Congress merely "gathered up the . . . threads" and wove the statute
from them. 57 In short, labor law was not a congressional invention.
The threads in the legislative loom had been spun by many hands,
and of these, many never had held a law book. Similarly, and in con-
trast to the German experience, the set of legal terms and relations
that established this category and mediated its meanings were not
largely the product of any single individual's architectonic insights,
but the fruit of a great deal of combined legal creativity.
Unlike its development in Germany, American labor law did not
proceed from the motive of erecting a comprehensive protective
55 For a thorough description and analysis of the contemporary German system,
see WEIss, supra note 53.
56 This protection came through the Betriebsr-Ategesetz [Works Councils Act] of
February 4, 1920 [RGBl. S.147], which provided that an aggrieved employee could
appeal a discharge to the Works Council (if one existed) and which detailed the pa-
rameters for just cause. As an alternative to reinstatement, the law permitted an em-
ployer to pay an unjustly discharged worker a statutorily set amount of compensation.
57 IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 18 (1950).
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scheme. Instead, Congress in the Wagner Act deliberately opted for a
system that would involve minimal state intervention in the employ-
ment relationship. Consequently, it sanctioned what is in essence a
self-help arrangement, which permitted the enhancement of individ-
ual status through the defense and maintenance of autonomous, self-
organized groups. There was remarkably little in the way of labor law
in the United States in 1935, and for nearly a generation, the Wagner
Act would keep it that way.58 Rather than attempting to erect an ar-
ticulated public-ordering framework by which to shape the employ-
ment relationship, Congress basically left the job to the parties
themselves.
To reduce these complicated developments to the compactness
of a motto: the more highly centralized German system would operate
largely through formal structures, while the diffused and locally-fo-
cused American scheme predominantly rested on a series of habits. A
habit constitutes a way of being. Two distinctive characteristics about
the American way of being seem to have played a crucial part in sup-
porting the employment-ordering scheme Congress had adopted.
The first shows itself in the historically remarkable propensity of
Americans to form associations. 59 The second is the pervasive, if often
indirect, influence that religiously conditioned understandings have
exercised over the imagination, feelings, and motives of Americans. 60
Both points typically are overlooked, especially the second. However,
the diminution of our associational habits and related changes in reli-
gious conceptions and practices have had a far greater impact on our
labor law schemes-and on nearly every other aspect of common
life-than has commonly been realized. 61
58 It was not until the advent of the civil-rights era that Congress would begin to
enact legislation that would affect the terms and status of virtually all employed per-
sons. (On this point, see Aaron, supra note 33, at 555-56). Given its relatively light
regulation of the employment relationship, one scholar has characterized the United
States as essentially a "developing country" in field of employment law. DIErER REU-
TER, FESTSCHRIFr FOR MARIE LUISE HILGER UND HERMANN STUMPF 586 (1983).
59 As a group, the Germans also have been known for their enthusiastic organiza-
tion of voluntary associations. How much union organization was affected by the vari-
ous legal prohibitions against the forming of workers' organizations, and by views of
the role of the state, is difficult to determine. For a general discussion, see NiPPERDEY,
supra note 51, at 320-34.
60 For an overview of this point, see Thomas C. Kohler, Labour Law and Labour
Relations: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, 12 INT'LJ. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUs. REL.
213 (1996), and sources cited therein.
61 For example, Catholics andjews traditionally have been far more hospitable to
union organization than other portions of the population, in part because of the way
both groups have understood community and their relations to others. See Thomas
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Despite the differences between the German and American labor
law schemes, collective bargaining lay at the heart of both. Similarly,
both conceived of its practice as a flexible and autonomous method
for ordering a relationship that had shifted from a largely family-based
setting to one frequently grounded in and increasingly conditioned by
large organizations. By the fourth decade of this century, labor law
had become a vibrant and established category in two of the modem
world's most studied legal systems. Although their development was
interrupted by the events surrounding World War II, the American
and German labor law schemes have become the world's most
influential.
In Franz Wieacker's assessment, the development of labor law
represents "one of the few indisputable achievements of our jurists in
this century."62 It also may represent one of the most evanescent.
Within the space of a lifetime, labor law, as a scheme of employment
ordering arranged around or closely tied to collective bargaining, vir-
tually has disappeared in the United States and is under tremendous
pressure nearly everywhere else. If the emergence or dissolution of a
legal scheme signifies a fundamental change in the way we imagine
ourselves and our relations to others, could a reflection on the trans-
formation of labor law63 have more to tell us about ourselves, and
about the likely shape of our future, than we might at first think?
III
Poor old labor law. Once one of the most discussed and debated
of all fields of law, few today would see it as the cutting edge of either
legal thought or practice. In the case of the United States, the same
holds true of "employment law," which has developed in an unsteady,
patchwork fashion as unionization and the influence of "traditional"
C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 Cmi.-KETrr L. REV. 229 (1993). For better than a
century, both in its membership and leadership, the American labor movement had
been heavily-if not predominantly-Catholic. The Second Vatican Council
(1962-65) changed many of the ways in which the understanding of community was
mediated to Catholics, which affected (or in the case of younger Catholics, often en-
tirely disrupted) the distinct "communal" attitudes and practices characteristic of
Catholics. The implications of these attitudinal changes go far beyond the spectacu-
lar decline in Church institutions that has occurred since the mid-1960s, and play
themselves out in the decline of unions as well as other forms of mediating bodies like
families, fraternal and political groups, neighborhoods, etc. This link will be pursued
in subsequent work.
62 WIEACKER, supra note 48, at 435.
63 In the case of the United States, this transformation includes the unsteady rise
of individual employment rights.
[VOL. 73:51328
DISINTEGRATION OF LABOR LAW
collective labor law has waned. Labor law may represent a true
achievement. But like a once-grand yet now untended formal garden,
meandering new growths have disguised the old designs and obscured
their symbols, while assuming no clear arrangement of their own.
This state should come as no surprise. The social, intellectual, eco-
nomic, moral, and cultural schemes that sustained the old patterns of
employment ordering have radically shifted in the United States and
are in the process of doing so everywhere else. In the meantime, new
patterns at all of these levels are seeking to coalesce, but have yet to
emerge. In short, we stand at the edge of a new world, one that will
entail new ways of being for all its inhabitants. The question facing us
is whether the schemes that will emerge will be the result of accident
and force, or of conscious, clear-eyed deliberation and sober, demo-
cratic choice.64 The stakes are as fantastic as the problems are
complex.
Briefly stated, history has backed us into something of a comer.
In light of the events surrounding 1989, we enjoy a nearly unprece-
dented freedom to determine the conditions for our common exist-
ence. As a result, we are accountable in an unparalleled way for the
consequences our choices bring. As self-constituting beings, we are
not simply the helpless hostages of blind fortune. Acting responsibly
in our new context requires us to acknowledge that good outcomes do
not emerge magically through some extrinsic force or as the result of
invariant necessity. Each of our decisions in some large or small way
shifts the schedules of probabilities. Consequently, there are trends of
development and of decline. Like it or not, each of us has been con-
scripted to act as a co-author of history.
To go further and propose that a sustained analysis of labor and
employment law issues could provide important perspectives on the
ordering questions facing us may at first glance appear preposterous.
We are accustomed to pursuing such important matters in the lofty
halls of constitutional theory and through the exquisite models of eco-
nomic and financial analysis. But, as seen, this proposition hardly
struck our predecessors as odd. Their answers could hardly be ours,
and an adequate approach to the problems involved must proceed on
a far wider intellectual front, and on a much sounder methodological
basis, than did theirs. Nevertheless, is it possible that in their ques-
tioning they were on to something that we have forgotten, and that
64 Cf THE FEDERALIsr No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[w]hether societies of men
are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitu-
tions, on accident and force.").
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the now frequently opaque categories in which they thought conceal
understandings and suggest insights that may be of real significance to
us?
Tellingly, labor law scholars have understood their field as a "vo-
cation"65 or as "a legal discipline with heart. '66 So it is. No other
branch of the law deals more intimately, nor more broadly, with the
conditions of daily human existence. Few, if any, must confront and
deal more directly with the economic, familial, and related social
schemes by which a society organizes itself. It is no mistake that the
founders of the field conceived it as a method for dealing with the
"social question." Among the matters basic to labor law are the nature
of our ties to others and the sorts of obligations that cooperative rela-
tionships entail. Issues concerning the character of human per-
sonhood never lie far from its surface. Thus, while one can speak of
labor and employment law as a discrete legal field, that is misleading.
It is by nature an interdisciplinary and cooperative endeavor. Those
who pursue it must be true generalists and willing to pursue insights
from areas that initially seem far removed.67 Similarly, given the inter-
nationalization of business and the trans-border and multi-cultural na-
ture of modern business organizations, any adequate reflection on
employment and its ordering demands a comparative approach.
Established employment ordering systems have become unstable
at a time when employment has become a-if not the-ubiquitous
preoccupation of the age. This instability has also occurred at a time
when, for better or for worse, people are tied to the workforce and to
the market in a way never before seen. The curious fate of labor law
poses a sort of limit case for the future of ordering generally. As tech-
nology increasingly demonstrates, work is ever more portable, and to
the extent that it becomes "virtual," much of it will have no location
whatever, at least in the sense that people, including lawyers, tend to
think of it. Likewise, there is a slowly growing trend toward employ-
ment as a "spot" or 'just-in-time" relationship. In short, like marriage
65 See Hugh Collins, Labour Law as a Vocation, 105 L.Q. REv. 468, 468-70, 472-73
(1989). "What I suggest brings coherence to Labour Law as a distinct field of legal
studies is a sense of vocation .... The sense of vocation marks out a field of inquiry
.... Id. at 473.
66 Bemd Rfithers, 35Jahre Arbeitsrecht in Deutschland, 1995 RECHT DER ARBEIT 326
"Indisputably, labor law has its peculiarities. It is a legal discipline with heart."
67 As Bemd Rfithers observes, in the eyes of their colleagues in more prestigious
areas such as constitutional or corporate law, labor scholars are "like vagabonds with-
out a permanent home, bordercrossers without papers or residence permits, an impu-
dent, pushy group, who gladly graze in foreign fields, or harvest in someone else's
garden." Id.
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and increasingly parenthood, employment-at least in the American
context-may be on the way to becoming a "serial event."
For those wishing to assume the tasks of a Sayre or a Sinzheimer
today, at least part of the way ahead is clear. The transformation of
labor law literally reflects the transformation of our way of being. In
the past, much of the scholarship on work and its ordering has been
taken up with themes like dependence and domination. This preoc-
cupation reflects the enormous influence of Hegel's dialectic of
master and slave, the echoes of which reverberate through the writ-
ings of the three thinkers whom Paul Ricoeur called the "masters of
suspicion": Marx, Neitzsche, and Freud. Although not without inter-
est, concentration on these themes has distracted attention from
more crucial inquiries into the way work and its ordering constitutes
humans and their relations to others. The new situation requires the
development of a new culture of work, which in turn requires a new
appreciation of human character.
At first sight, employment ordering may appear to be a grindingly
mundane subject. Few topics, however, bring the human to the
center in a more forceful or complete way. A study along the lines
suggested here would not only recontextualize our understanding of a
field of law, but would be a significant step toward a reforming of the
way we understand the human sciences as well. Such a reorientation
involves a change in meanings, which will not be without controversy.
Avoiding the questions, however, will not make them disappear.
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